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Abstract—We combine the power flow model with the pro-
portionally fair optimization criterion to study the control of
congestion within a distribution electric grid network. The form
of the mathematical optimization problem is a convex second
order cone that can be solved by modern non-linear interior
point methods and constitutes the core of a dynamic simulation
of electric vehicles (EV) joining and leaving the charging network.
The preferences of EV drivers, represented by simple algorithmic
strategies, are conveyed to the optimizing component by real-
time adjustments to user-specific weighting parameters that
are then directly incorporated into the objective function. The
algorithmic strategies utilize a small number of parameters that
characterize the user’s budgets, expectations on the availability
of vehicles and the charging process. We investigate the collective
behaviour emerging from individual strategies and evaluate their
performance by means of computer simulation.
Index Terms—EV charging strategies, optimal power flow
model, proportional fairness
I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity congestion problems may become a barrier to
large-scale adoption of EVs. A typical EV requires around
1 kWh for every 3-4 miles of driving, potentially making
EVs significant energy consumers in the future [1]. Intelligent
management of EV charging can reduce the need for expensive
new generation, transmission, and distribution facilities by
shifting and controlling the load demand caused by EVs. Since
the state of the electric network evolves in time, owners of EVs
would have to supervise charging of their vehicle in real time
and make decisions on a scale of minutes, which is definitely
impossible. A solution is to develop algorithmic strategies
(software agents) that take responsibility for decisions that are
associated with the charging of EVs. Replacement of human
decision making by software agents is already notable in areas
as stock markets, personal assistants or autonomous vehicles.
There has been a large research activity in the last few years
in the area of EV charge scheduling with the major efforts
summarized in survey papers. Studies analysing the impacts
of EVs on distribution networks considering aspects such
as driving patterns, charging characteristics, charge timing,
and EV penetration are summarized in [2]. A survey of
studies analysing the impacts of EVs in a broader sense
(grid impacts, economic and environmental impacts) was
given in [3]. A review paper of EV charging scheduling ap-
proaches [1] distinguishes two large classes: unidirectional and
bidirectional charging. Each class is further classified based
on whether the scheduling is centralized or distributed and
whether the mobility aspects, renewable energy sources and
ancillary services (e.g. frequency control, generation control)
are considered. Furthermore, the paper overviews the type of
objective function and the optimization techniques that were
used. Other review papers address EV charging from specific
perspectives such as grid management [4], the interaction of
EVs and smart grids [5], the optimization techniques used [6]
and EV modelling [7].
The mathematical concept of proportional fairness as a
network congestion mechanism in electricity networks has
been considered already by several authors. In [8], proportional
fairness has been shown as superior to max-flow, while eval-
uating the critical arrival rate of vehicles leading to the con-
gestion on the electricity network. An EV charging approach
based on proportional fairness while considering linear and
additive flow capacity constraints, and using a decentralized
solving approach based on dual prices was proposed in [9].
Work [10] builds on [11], [12] and proposes a decentralized
scheme to allocate proportionally fair charging rates to EVs.
The network is represented as a price signal that informs
the charging scheme about the congestion level. Willingness
to pay and price determine the charging rate following the
framework proposed in [11]. This paper discusses the main
principles, but the interaction of users is not investigated and
the choice of the willingness to pay parameter is limited to
constant values or random numbers. In this paper, we further
extend this body of literature by combining the concept of
proportional fairness with an optimization model that takes
into account the network in a more realistic way and by
extending a mathematical description of algorithmic charging
strategies [13] (see Section II). In Section III, we present
results of selected numerical experiments and evaluate them.
Section IV concludes the paper by summarizing the main
findings.
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II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Concept of the proposed approach
EV charging is an ideal venue for demand response as the
charging load is more elastic compared to other residential
loads (e.g. cooking, heating etc.). Often, users park their
vehicles in the evening when returning from work and need
them to be ready again in the morning. We investigate an
approach that exploits the elasticity of EV loads to distribute
available network capacity to EVs while the line voltage levels
remain within a predefined range. We control the charging of
EVs in real-time. In our model, the interests of a user are
represented by an algorithmic entity or software agent that
acts on their behalf. EV drivers only select the strategy and
set a few parameter values. Depending on the allocated budget,
state of charge or departure time, software agent l determines
the value of the willingness to pay parameter wl(t) and sends
it to the electric power distribution network. As only a single
value wl(t) is revealed to the network the majority of a user’s
sensitive data is protected. The network collects wl(t) values
from all users and combines the Optimal Power Flow model
with the Proportional Fairness criterion to determine the values
of power Pl(t) that are allocated to vehicles.
B. Optimization problem
A mathematical optimization problem forms the core of
the simulation model. We denote the set of vehicles that are
willing to pay a positive amount for electric energy at time
t as N (t). The solution of an optimization model is used to
determine the vector of electric powers P (t) = (Pl(t) : l ∈
N (t)) that are allocated to electric vehicles, while maintaining
the parameters of the power grid network within operational
limits. The feasible set of power allocations is denoted as P(t).
We solve the optimization problem
maximise
P (t)
∑
l∈N (t)
wl(t) log(Pl(t)) (1)
subject to P (t) ∈ P(t), (2)
where wl(t) are non-negative weights. Problem (1)-(2) can be
interpreted as a network protocol that distributes network ca-
pacity to vehicles. For wl(t) = 1, we recover the proportional
fairness allocation [11]. However, by including values wl(t)
as weights, the shares can be arbitrarily changed according
to a weighted proportionally fair allocation. Values Pl(t) are
non-negative and when wl(t) = 0, then the term with Pl(t) is
excluded from (1) and set to value of 0.
The mathematical description of the set of feasible solutions
P(t), is derived from the optimal power flow problem [14]. For
this purpose, we model the distribution network by a directed
tree graph G(V, E), where V is a set of nodes (called buses)
and E is set of edges (called branches). By the symbol V+, we
denote the set of all nodes excluding the root node (feeder).
Voltage drops are significant in distribution networks, and to
a large extent determine the network capacity, which leads
us to using the model of power flow specific to distribution
networks [15].
To derive the mathematical description of the set of feasible
solutions P(t), we applied the procedure described in [16],
[17]. In the first step, power flows are expressed in terms of
complex nodal voltages vi(t), where i is a network node. To
avoid quadratic expressions, nodal voltages for network edges
connecting node i with the node j are substituted by complex
variables Vij(t) = vi(t)vj(t)∗ using the symbol ∗, to denote
the complex conjugate. The resulting problem is non-convex,
but if the network is radial and if electric powers extracted or
injected at nodes and electric powers flowing through power
lines are not constrained, we can apply SOCP relaxation that
is exact [14] and leads to the optimization model (3)-(7). The
quantities gij , and bij denote the conductance and susceptance
of power lines, respectively. If X is a complex quantity, then
its real (active) part is denoted as Re(X) and imaginary
(reactive) part is Im(X). Constraints (4) and (5) ensure the
conservation of active and reactive power at individual network
nodes, respectively. Constraints (6) keep the square of the
voltage magnitude within the lower bound vi2 and upper
bound vi2. Constraints (5) are a by-product of the substitution
Vij(t) = vi(t)vj(t)
∗, maintaining the specific relation between
the variables Vii(t), Vjj(t) and Vij(t).
C. Charging strategies
Charging strategies are inspired by the digital file trans-
mission strategies that were originally proposed for use in
communication networks [12]. The charging strategy is an
algorithm updating the willingness to pay parameter, wl(t),
of a vehicle l in order to influence the charging process.
All the presented strategies assume a limited budget W lmax,
such that the time integral of wl(t) cannot exceed this value.
Moreover, to facilitate the comparison between strategies, it
is assumed that vehicles have a limited time T lmax to stay
connected to the charger. Consequently, a connected vehicle
l is disconnected from the network in three cases: its battery
is fully charged, the budget W lmax allocated to the charging
operation was completely spent, or the maximum connected
time T lmax elapsed.
1) Uniform spending in time (UT strategy): As a refer-
ence strategy, we introduce this simple strategy, where the
parameter wUTl (t) is set to a constant value
W lmax
T lmax
throughout
the charging process. Thus, in this case the whole budget is
spent uniformly over time during the time period T lmax that
the vehicle l is charging.
2) Uniform charging in time (UC strategy): Vehicles rep-
resented by this strategy aim to gain a constant amount of
energy per unit of time, while using the entire time interval
allocated for charging. Hence, vehicle l updates its willingness
to pay parameter using the formula
wUCl (t) = max
{
0, wUCl (t−∆t)− κ∆t
(
Bl(t)− t−T
l
arr
T lmax
Blmax
)}
, (8)
where T larr is the time when the vehicle l was plugged into
the network. The UC strategy increases its willingness to
pay parameter wUCl (t), when the state of battery Bl(t) is
lower than the target value t−T
l
arr
T lmax
Blmax and decreases w
UC
l (t)
maximise
V (t),P (t)
∑
l∈N (t)
wl(t) log(Pl(t)) (3)
subject to ∑
j:eij∈E
(gij(Vii(t)−Re{Vij(t)}) + bijIm{Vij(t)}) =
∑
l∈Ci(t)
Pl(t) i ∈ V+ (4)∑
j:eij∈E
(bij(Vii(t)−Re{Vij(t)})− gijIm{Vij(t)}) = 0 i ∈ V+ (5)
vi
2 ≤ Vii(t) ≤ vi2 i ∈ V (6)∥∥∥∥∥∥
 2Re{Vij(t)}2Im{Vij(t)}
Vii(t)− Vjj(t)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ Vii(t) + Vjj(t) eij ∈ E . (7)
otherwise. Thus, a user expects that the battery should be
charged linearly in time, while reaching full capacity Blmax at
the time of departure. A limited budget may lead to spending
the budget before the time interval T lmax has elapsed. Here
and throughout κ > 0 is a scaling parameter.
3) Affordable spending (AF strategy): This strategy is
inspired by the file-transfer strategy introduced in [12]. On
average, the algorithm tries to pay a price W lmax/B
l
max per
unit of energy. The user l updates its willingness to pay by
comparing the current value wAFl (t) paid per unit of received
power Pl(t) with the price that this user can afford to pay per
unit of energy W
l
rem(t)
Blmax−Bl(t) , where W
l
rem(t) is the remaining
budget that vehicle l can still use for charging at time t. The
willingness to pay parameter wAFl (t) is updated as follows:
wAFl (t) = max
{
wAFl (t−∆t) + κ∆t
(
W lrem(t)
Blmax−Bl(t) −
wAFl (t−∆t)
Pl(t)
)
, wmin
}
. (9)
Parameter wmin > 0 allows the algorithm to restart the
charging process after any time periods when it appears too
expensive to charge. A possible drawback of this strategy is
that it does not consider the time limit T lmax, and thus it takes
no action as the departure time of a vehicle is approaching.
4) Combination of affordable spending with uniform spend-
ing in time (AFT strategy): Strategy AFT builds on the AF
strategy and makes it sensitive to the time limit T lmax. The
motivation behind this strategy is to maximize the gained
energy when the time limit is approaching even if not saving
any budget. Strategy AFT either pays the affordable amount
per unit of energy or towards the end of the time limit T lmax,
it pays a fraction of what is affordable to pay per unit of time.
A point at which the strategy starts depleting the budget is
controlled by the pre-factor α(t) ∈ (−∞, 1], i.e.
wAFTi (t) = max
{
wAFl (t), α(t)
W lrem(t)
T lmax − t
}
. (10)
We chose
α(t) =
t− T larr
T lmax(1− d)
− d
1− d , (11)
where the parameter d ∈ [0, 1) defines the point (expressed
as the fraction of T lmax), when the linearly growing function
α(t) is equal to zero.
The optimization model (3)-(7) was solved with CVXOPT
solver (http://cvxopt.org) and the simulation model was im-
plemented in Python programming language and is available
for download from https://bit.ly/2qO9CkX.
III. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
Our results are organized in two sections. In section III-A,
we analyse the behaviour of charging strategies at the micro-
scopic level, in a pre-designed stylized situation, to explore
mutual interactions of vehicles and collective phenomena.
In section III-B, the average performance of the charging
strategies at the macroscopic level is evaluated.
A. Exploration of collective properties of algorithmic strate-
gies at microscopic level
Preliminary experiments have shown that the network topol-
ogy has an important effect on power allocations. Firstly, we
eliminate the network effects from the behaviour of strategies
by using a network with the structure displayed in Figure 1.
Vehicles connect only to nodes 2−11 and each line eij ∈ E has
resistance rij = 0.1 and reactance xij = 0.6 (these are average
values estimated from a real-world network [18]). Thus, all
vehicles compete for the capacity of the edge that is connecting
nodes 0 and 1. Furthermore, in all the experiments presented
in this paper constraints (6), take the form
V 2nominal(1− α)2 ≤ Vii ≤ V 2nominal(1 + α)2 i ∈ V, (12)
where Vnominal = 1.0, α = 0.1 and we set d = 0.75 and
κ = 0.001.
Figure 1: Network used in the scenario to explore the collective
properties of the algorithmic strategies at microscopic level.
We considered a population of vehicles with heterogeneous
budgets and arrival of ”aggresive” vehicle. In this scenario
exactly one vehicle is connected to nodes l = 2, . . . , 10,
with Blmax = 20, T
l
max = 300, B(0) = 0 and
W lmax = 1.3
l−2500. The node 11 is initially empty. At
time t = 100 an aggressive vehicle following UT strategy is
connected to node 11 with budget W 11max = 10 000 000,
B11max = 20 and T
11
max = 100. The purpose of this
experiment is to illustrate the behaviour of strategies when
vehicles posses different budgets and the network experiences
the arrival of aggressive vehicle possessing a huge budget
that needs to be charged fast. Since the aggressive vehicle
will consume the majority of the resources of the electric
network, this experiment also models a situation, where the
electric network moves suddenly into a congested state, in
which the total demand of individual vehicles cannot be
fulfilled. Vehicles using the UT strategy, are charged in the
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Figure 2: Evolution of battery state and willingness to pay
parameters for a scenario with heterogeneous budgets and the
arrival of aggressive vehicle. We plot zoom of the first 100
time units of the willingness to pay evolution in the inset of
panel (d). An aggressive user that possesses huge budget and
follows UT strategy arrived to the network at time t = 100.
The evolution of the state of battery for aggressive user is
shown in red colour.
non-increasing order of the available budget, thus the vehicle
charging with the highest rate is the vehicle with the maximum
budget. Since with this strategy the users do not update their
willingness to pay parameter during the charging process, the
only factor impacting the speed of charging process is the
number of vehicles in the network. Figure 2a shows that
charging process of vehicles with lower budgets speed up
as vehicles with higher budgets leave the network. After the
arrival of aggressive vehicle, other users following the UT
strategy continue to receive electric energy at a much slower
rate. The time limit T lmax = 300.0 was insufficient to charge
fully the four vehicles that started with the smallest budgets.
In the Figure 2c, it is not possible to distinguish individual
vehicles. While updating willingness to pay in time t, the UC
strategy only considers the current battery state B(t) and the
remaining time in the network T lmax−t. Since these quantities
are independent of the remaining budget, the charging process
of all connected vehicles is the same. Initially, vehicles do not
need to compete over the capacity and consequently vehicles
consume only a very small part of the budget. The inset
of Figure 2d zooms the region of the first 100 time units
to better see the evolution of the willingness to pay. As
soon as the aggressive vehicle arrived, other vehicles start to
compete for electric power by increasing the willingness to
pay parameter, because their charging processes did not fulfil
demanded constant intake of electric energy. This competition
resulted in spending the entire budget of vehicles before they
could reach full battery capacity (see Figure 2d).
Vehicles following the AF strategy are charged in the same
order as for the UT strategy. Even though the order is the
same, there is one distinct behavioural difference between the
two strategies, which can be best seen on the vehicles that
are charged with the lowest speed. The sorting effect is more
pronounced for AF strategy as smaller number of vehicles
is being charged simultaneously. Since vehicles with higher
budget can afford to pay more, vehicles with lower budget
set their willingness to pay to wmin and wait for the price
to decrease. After the arrival of the aggressive vehicle, all
charging vehicles detected that the price per unit of energy
is too high, and they lowered their willingness to pay to the
lowest possible value wmin. This can be seen in the Figure 2f.
When the aggressive vehicle leaves the network, the price per
unit of energy decreases and remaining vehicles increase their
willingness to pay parameter again. This behaviour is quite
reasonable, as it is essentially impossible to compete against
the aggressive user. In this case, three vehicles did not manage
to charge fully.
The behaviour of AFT strategy is in this experiment qual-
itatively similar to the AF strategy. The sorting effect and
waiting for lower price per energy unit can be also observed.
Compared to the AF strategy only some subtle differences
appear that can be seen in Figure 2h, where the increase in the
willingness to pay parameter towards the end of the simulation
is higher than in the Figure 2f. Close examination of Figures 2e
and 2f reveals that strategy AFT charges fully one vehicles
less. However, vehicles that receive the least amount of energy
are charged to a higher level.
B. Average performance of charging strategies
To evaluate the average performance of charging strategies,
we assume a Poisson arrival process characterized by the
arrival rate λ. The value of λ is varied in the range, which
is broad enough to observe nearly all vehicles fully charged
(free-flow state) and to demonstrate situations when vehicles
are charged to only a small degree (congested state). In the
numerical experiments, we used the network topology shown
in Figure 3, the same setting of parameters as in the previous
Section (unless reported otherwise) and we assume a uniform
population of strategies. We set the simulation horizon to
10 000 time units and run at least 20 independent realizations
for each value of the arrival rate.
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Figure 3: Electric network used in numerical experiments
exploring the average performance of charging strategies [18].
Node 1 is the root node. Nodes 13, 17, 19, 23 and 24 (in
lighter colour) are photovoltaic generators, and we removed
them from the network.
As expected, the main trend in the Figure 4 is that with
increasing the arrival rate the state of charge of batteries,
measured at the time of departure of the vehicles from the
network, decreases. Strategies UT, AF and AFT behave in
broadly similar way, while strategy UC reaches significantly
smaller average state of charge which is also reflected by the
significantly smaller number of vehicles that are fully charged
(see Figures 4a-4b).
In the free-flow state, strategy UC spends the least budget
on average (see Figure 4c). However, the vehicles have the
smallest battery level when they depart. The average battery
level on departure is lower than in other strategies. This is
caused by vehicles connected to nodes distant from the root
node. Often, they need to increase their willingness to pay
parameter to keep the required charging rate and consequently
they run out of the budget.
In the congested state, the majority of vehicles following
strategies UT, AF and AFT leave the network at the departure
time T lmax (see Figure 4d), while vehicles following strategy
UC typically run out of the budget. This is caused by the ex-
tensive competition in increasing willingness to pay parameter
between vehicles following strategy UC and it is also reflected
by the high price paid per unit of energy (see Figure 4e).
Consequently, the connected time of vehicles following UC
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Figure 4: Comparison of average values of selected statistics
for all investigated charging strategies as a function of arrival
rate λ. Ribbons, which are in most of the cases narrower than
the size of symbols, represent 95 percent confidence intervals
of average values. Average battery level at departure, number
of fully charged vehicles and number of vehicles disconnected
at time T lmax have been rescaled.
strategy is short, when the network is congested and long
in free-flow (see Figure 4f). With all other strategies it is
other way around. While in the free-flow vehicles are quickly
charged and leave the network, and in the congested state they
utilize the whole time period they are given for charging and
wait for more favourable conditions to collect some energy.
Another interesting observation can be found in Figures 4c
and 4e. With increasing arrival rate λ, the remaining budget
typically decreases and the price paid per unit of energy
increases, except for strategy AF, where the remaining budget
grows and the price paid per unit of energy stays almost
constant. This is because in the congested state, the price
per unit of received energy is often unaffordably high. In the
congested state, significantly more vehicles are fully charged
by the AF strategy. This can be attributed to the sharp increase
in the willingness to pay parameter when the state of charge
approaches full capacity. The secondary effect of the sharp
increase is that other vehicles lower their willingness to pay
parameter (to avoid the aggressive user), which increases the
likelihood that the vehicle reaches full battery even more.
Strategies AF and AFT are similar, the main difference is
that strategy AFT utilizes information about the departure time
of vehicles and strategy AF does not. Thus, it is surprising that
strategy AFT charges fully a smaller fraction of vehicles and
their average battery level at departure is smaller than for the
AF strategy. This can be attributed to indirect effects. When
the AFT strategy increases the willingness to pay parameter
for a vehicle connected to a more distant node shortly before
it leaves the network, this vehicle receives more energy than
it would receive with the AF strategy. However, when the
network is congested this is at the expense of other vehicles
that are closer to the source node. Vehicles positioned closer
to the source node consume less network resources and they
could receive more energy in total, if using the AF strategy. To
summarize, the way strategy AFT uses information about the
departure of vehicles T lmax, leads to the lower total average
charging level of vehicles at the departure, but the vehicles that
are connected to more distant nodes from the root node are
charged to higher degree. Thus, unexpectedly what the AFT
strategy gains compared to the AF strategy in a congested state
is not a higher average state of charge of batteries at the time
of departure of vehicles but a more even final level of charge
across vehicles.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we took some initial steps toward under-
standing the collective effects potentially emerging in future
smart electric grids, arising from approaches that are exploiting
flexibility of loads, such as charging of electric vehicles,
using basic market mechanisms. The users are allowed to
pre-allocate a limited budget, which they wish to spend for a
service and they state the time interval within which the service
can be provided. We elaborated a mathematical model of the
electric distribution network that allocates network resources
based on the proportional fairness mechanism. We proposed
simple algorithmic strategies without memory capable of han-
dling budget and charging time restrictions using different
approaches and we investigated the behaviour emerging from
individual strategies in pre-designed situations. Furthermore,
we studied the average behaviour of strategies.
Our analyses show that even simple strategies that prescribe
how a limited budget is spent can lead to interesting collective
effects, such as the emergence of a sorting effect in charging
of vehicles, avoidance of aggressive users, or to unexpected
indirect effects, when instead of increasing the average state
of charge, equality among vehicles is enhanced. Our results
vividly illustrate the need to carefully analyse collective effects
emerging in complex systems in order to avoid negative effects
and to exploit positive ones.
Future steps could focus on the collective behaviour of
strategies and identify other interesting behavioural patterns.
For example, the number of vehicles could be periodically
increasing (congestion builds up) and decreasing (congestion
resolves) or scenarios with mixed composition of strategies
could be investigated. Interesting results could be obtained by
strategies that use learning mechanisms.
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